Risk Factors for SARS among Persons without Known Contact with SARS Patients, Beijing, China by Wu, Jiang et al.
Most cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) have occurred in close contacts of SARS patients.
However, in Beijing, a large proportion of SARS cases
occurred in persons without such contact. We conducted a
case-control study in Beijing that compared exposures of
94 unlinked, probable SARS patients with those of 281
community-based controls matched for age group and sex.
Case-patients were more likely than controls to have chron-
ic medical conditions or to have visited fever clinics (clinics
at which possible SARS patients were separated from
other patients), eaten outside the home, or taken taxis fre-
quently. The use of masks was strongly protective. Among
31 case-patients for whom convalescent-phase (>21 days)
sera were available, 26% had immunoglobulin G to SARS-
associated coronavirus. Our finding that clinical SARS was
associated with visits to fever clinics supports Beijing’s
strategy of closing clinics with poor infection-control meas-
ures. Our finding that mask use lowered the risk for disease
supports the community’s use of this strategy. 
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a new
disease caused by a previously unrecognized coron-
avirus (1,2). Investigations of SARS outbreaks in
several countries suggest that the primary mode of trans-
mission is close contact with a symptomatic patient.
Indeed, most cases of SARS have occurred among persons
who cared for or lived with someone with the disease, and
this fact is reflected in the SARS case definition developed
by the World Health Organization and in definitions devel-
oped by individual countries (3–7). 
The SARS epidemic in Beijing, during which a total of
2,521 probable cases were reported from March through
June 2003, was notable for its magnitude (8). Another dis-
tinguishing feature was the relatively high proportion of
probable case-patients with no reported close contact with
other SARS patients. Although the outbreaks in Hong
Kong and Toronto were also large, most case-patients had
healthcare-related or household links to other SARS
patients (4,9). Beijing’s epidemic began with importations
of SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) in travelers
returning from Guangdong Province and Hong Kong (8),
and the first phase of the epidemic involved hospitalized
patients, family members, and healthcare workers exposed
to these travelers. During this period (March 8–April 3,
2003), almost all (96%) probable SARS patients reported
close contact with a known SARS patient. However, dur-
ing the peak of the epidemic (April 4–May 4), the percent-
age of probable SARS patients who reported no contact
with another SARS patient and who were not healthcare
workers rose to 42%; as the number of cases fell during the
last part of the epidemic (May 5–June), this percentage
increased to 65%. The reasons for these apparently
unlinked SARS cases were unknown. Possible explana-
tions included acquisition of disease from unrecognized
sources in the community or healthcare setting, incomplete
collection or recording of contact histories, and clinical ill-
ness that met the SARS case definition but was caused by
etiologic agents other than SARS-CoV. 
To evaluate these hypotheses, we conducted a matched
case-control study during the Beijing outbreak among a
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The epidemiologic criteria changed during the course of
the outbreak. Before April 3, 2003, only patients who had
close contact with a known SARS patient or who had
infected other persons could be diagnosed with SARS.
From April 4 to May 3, the epidemiologic criteria were
expanded to include persons with a history of visiting or
residing in cities or areas where local transmission of
SARS was occurring or with a history of contact with an
outbreak or a healthcare facility. After May 3, Beijing was
regarded as having local transmission of SARS, and visit-
ing or residing in Beijing was considered sufficient to meet
the epidemiologic criteria of the case definition.
Laboratory testing for SARS-CoV was not part of the case
definition. 
Close Contacts
Close contacts of SARS patients were defined as per-
sons who shared meals, utensils, a residence, a hospital
room, or a transportation vehicle with a suspected SARS
patient or as persons who visited such a patient in a period
beginning up to 14 days before the patient’s onset of symp-
toms. In addition, persons with potential contact with the
bodily secretions of a SARS patient during the patient’s
treatment or care were considered close contacts.
Study Design
A matched case-control study design was used. Case-
patients and controls were matched by sex and age group
(<17, 18–25, 26–45, 46–64, and >65 years). The goal was
to enroll 100 case-patients matched with three controls
each, which, if one assumes an α of 0.05 and 80% power,
would allow detection of an odds ratio of >2.3 for expo-
sures observed in 15% of controls. For the analysis, we
excluded all controls <14 years of age because of potential
biases in comparing them with matched case-patients aged
14–17 years. In addition, case-patients who were reclassi-
fied as healthcare workers after interview were excluded
along with their matched controls.
Case-patients were eligible for the study if they met the
probable case definition and reported no close contact with
any known probable or suspected SARS patients. Only
patients whose hospitalization occurred after April 28,
2003, were included in the study. A list of patients admit-
ted to the 16 designated SARS hospitals in Beijing was
obtained periodically, and we called patients at the hospi-
tal ward or their homes (after discharge) to invite them to
participate. The latest date of hospitalization included in
our study was June 9, 2003. Case interviews were complet-
ed June 3–16.
We selected controls by sequential digit dialing, using
the case-patient’s home telephone number as the index
number. The last digit was added to or subtracted from by
one digit in an alternating sequence until three controls
matched by sex and age group were enrolled. Telephone
prefixes are geographically clustered in Beijing, so this
strategy was intended to provide neighborhood matching.
Only one control was selected for each number dialed.
Control interviews were completed by July 4.
Data Collection
Data from case-patients were collected in person or by
telephone, by using a standardized questionnaire.
Information was collected on potential risk factors for, or
exposures to, SARS-CoV infection (such as having a
chronic disease or visiting a healthcare facility), personal
hygiene (such as washing hands), and the use of masks.
The period of inquiry was the 2 weeks before the patient’s
onset of symptoms. For case-patients who reported visiting
hospitals during the period of interest, a supplemental
questionnaire was developed to collect detailed informa-
tion on reasons for the visits and the hospitals and depart-
ments visited. Controls were interviewed by telephone and
were queried about a reference period corresponding to the
same 2-week period as the matched case.
Trained staff from the Beijing Center for Disease
Prevention and Control interviewed all case-patients and
approximately half of the controls. To accelerate enroll-
ment, we used a commercial contractor to interview the
remaining controls; the contractor received interviewer
training by study staff before beginning the interviews. For
quality control purposes, 10% of the contractor-inter-
viewed controls were interviewed twice. 
Laboratory Tests
Case-patients were asked to come to Beijing Center for
Disease Prevention and Control so that a 5-mLblood spec-
imen could be obtained. Blood samples were centrifuged,
and serum samples were refrigerated at 4°C. Sera were
tested at the Beijing Center for Disease Prevention and
Control for immunoglobulin (Ig) G antibody to SARS-
CoV, by using an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay kit
(Beijing Huada GBI Biotechnology Co. Ltd., Beijing). All
serum samples were obtained >21 days after illness onset,
and 80% of them were obtained 76–106 days after onset of
symptoms.
Statistical Analyses
Matched univariate and multivariate analyses were
conducted by conditional logistic regression. The PHREG
procedure in SAS version 8 (SAS, Cary, NC) was used,
with case status as the dependent variable. Factors associ-
ated with p values of <0.15 on univariate analysis were
included in multivariable models. Collinearity and pair-
wise interactions were evaluated for all variables in the
final model.
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A total of 373 patients were called from the master list
until 100 were interviewed. Among patients who could be
reached, the refusal rate was approximately 50%. The most
frequent reasons for refusal were “tired of being inter-
viewed” and being reluctant to disclose any personal infor-
mation for fear of stigma and discrimination. Patients who
agreed to participate in the study were similar in terms of
age, sex, and temperature (on clinic presentation) to all
probable SARS case-patients without a history of contact
with another SARS patient (n = 1,091). Seven controls
were excluded because they were <14 years of age, which
resulted in the elimination of two matched sets. Four
matched sets were also excluded because the case-patient
was subsequently reclassified as a healthcare worker. A
total of 94 case-patients and 281 matched controls were
included in the final analyses.
Male patients accounted for 50% of case-patients. The
median age was 29 years (range 14–84) for case-patients
and 31 years (range 14–82) for controls. In univariate
analyses, several health-related risk factors were signifi-
cantly associated with an increased risk for clinically diag-
nosed SARS, including having visited any fever clinic
(clinics established to separate patients who might have
SARS from other persons being evaluated in emergency
rooms or outpatient clinics) or any hospital or having a
preexisting chronic disease, such as diabetes (Table 1).
Eating out more than once a week and using several types
of transportation, including taking a taxi or bus at least
once a week, were associated with SARS (Table 1).
Having visited a farmer’s market, wearing a mask when
going out, and washing hands when returning home were
protective factors. Factors that were not associated with
SARS included visiting a school or university, participat-
ing in large social gatherings outside the home, having
mice or cockroaches in the home, and having stayed home
from work or school. No case-patients or controls reported
having traveled to SARS-affected areas, such as
Guangdong, Hong Kong, or Toronto.
Factors associated with SARS in multivariable analysis
are presented in Table 2. After other factors were con-
trolled for, visiting a fever clinic and having a chronic
medical condition remained significantly associated with a
risk for SARS. After other variables were adjusted for,
having visited a hospital was not associated with acquiring
SARS. Other factors associated with an increased risk for
SARS were eating outside the home and taking taxis more
than once a week. Always wearing a mask when going out
was associated with a 70% reduction in risk compared with
never wearing a mask. Wearing a mask intermittently was
associated with a smaller yet significant reduction in risk.
Going to the farmer’s market and owning a pet were both
protective factors.
As of August 28, 2003, a total of 31 blood specimens
had been tested for IgG to SARS-CoV, and 8 (26%) were
positive. Of the eight seropositive case-patients, three had
not visited a hospital or fever clinic in the 2 weeks before
becoming ill.
Discussion
SARS-CoV transmission is now understood to involve
close contact of symptomatic patients with others.
Surveillance and case management in most parts of the
world have focused on patients with clinically compatible
illness who had had exposure to another SARS patient or
had traveled to an affected area. Once SARS was recog-
nized as widespread in Beijing hospitals, respiratory ill-
ness in any Beijing resident raised suspicion of SARS, and
health authorities urged a low threshold for consideration
of SARS to institute patient isolation, case reporting, and
contact tracing. In the Beijing outbreak, the large number
of patients who were diagnosed with probable SARS with-
out a contact history led to concerns that overdiagnosis
was occurring or, alternatively, that unrecognized sources
of transmission existed in the community. Our study sug-
gests that both factors were involved.
Thirty percent of case-patients in this study had a histo-
ry of visiting a hospital in the 2 weeks before onset of
SARS. By univariate analysis, persons with SARS were
more than three times as likely as age- and sex-matched
controls to have visited hospitals. After other factors,
including the presence of chronic medical conditions, were
controlled for, visiting a hospital was not independently
associated with a higher risk for clinical SARS. The fre-
quency of a history of hospital exposure among our case-
patients was consistent with the epidemiology of SARS
observed in other major outbreaks, where hospitals served
as important amplifiers of transmission. Instituting effec-
tive infection-control measures in healthcare settings is the
most critical step in controlling the spread of SARS.
Fever clinics were established in Beijing for triage of
patients who might have SARS to separate them from
other persons being evaluated in emergency rooms or out-
patient clinics. Our study found that visiting a fever clinic
was a very strong risk factor for SARS. Through a follow-
up questionnaire administered to patients who reported
having visited hospitals or clinics, we attempted to ensure
that the reported visits were for reasons other than the first
symptoms of the SARS illness. Our finding that visiting
fever clinics increased the risk for probable SARS infec-
tion confirms the suspicions of public health authorities
that, early in the epidemic response, some fever clinics had
not implemented appropriate isolation and triage proce-
dures and supports the public health decision to close
dozens of problematic fever clinics and enhance infection-
control measures at the 66 clinics that remained open.
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ditions also had a significantly higher risk of clinical
SARS developing. A disproportionate occurrence of the
disease in persons who are elderly or who have a chronic
disease was noted in other SARS outbreaks, but whether
these factors were just markers for persons likely to have
nosocomial exposure to other SARS patients was unclear.
Our study found that the SARS risk associated with chron-
ic disease was independent of recent exposure to health-
care facilities and suggests that, as is the case for other
types of pneumonia (10,11), persons with chronic medical
conditions are more vulnerable to clinically defined SARS.
We had insufficient numbers of laboratory-confirmed
cases to verify that this finding was specific for SARS-
CoV infection. 
Because a considerable proportion of SARS cases
were reported in persons without a history of contact with
another SARS patient and without exposure to healthcare
facilities, we sought to identify unrecognized sources of
community transmission that might help target control
strategies and clarify whether widespread community
transmission was indeed occurring. We found that certain
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Table 1. Selected potential risk and protective factors among cases and matched controls during the 2 weeks before the case-patient’s 
onset of SARS-related symptoms, Beijing, 2003
a 
Potential risk or protective factor for SARS 
% of cases with factor 
N=94 
% of controls with factor 
N = 281 
Matched OR  
(95% CI)
 b  p value 
Healthcare related          
Visited any hospital   30  10  3.6 (2.0 to 6.5)  <0.001 
Visited any fever clinic
c  15  1  13.4 (3.8 to 46.7)  <0.001 
Having any chronic disease
d  19  7  4.1 (1.8 to 9.3)  <0.001 
Community related         
Visited any school or college  14  16  0.8 (0.4 to 1.6)  0.52 
Visited any quarantine site  2  2  1.2 (0.2 to 6.2)  0.83 
Attended any social gathering
e  7  10  0.8 (0.3 to 1.8)  0.52 
Visited any movie theater, concert hall, or indoor gym  2  4  0.6 (0.1 to 2.8)  0.48 
Visited any farmer’s market  23  37  0.5 (0.3 to 0.9)  0.01 
Eating out         
Never  62  70  Reference   
Once a week  14  15  1.2 (0.6 to 2.4)  0.67 
More than once a week  24  15  2.3 (1.2 to 4.5)  0.01 
Riding a bus         
Never  62  73  Reference   
Once a week  13  7  2.3 (1.0 to 5.2)  0.04 
More than once a week  25  19  1.7 (0.9 to 3.1)  0.08 
Taking a taxi         
Never  80  79  Reference   
Once a week  7  16  0.4 (0.2 to 1.0)  0.05 
More than once a week  13  4  3.2 (1.3 to 8.0)  0.01 
Taking the subway         
Never  88  91  Reference   
Once a week  1  4  0.3 (0.0 to 2.3)  0.25 
More than once a week  11  5  2.5 (1.0 to 6.6)  0.06 
Home related         
Did not go to work/attend school  39  40  1.0 (0.6 to 1.6)  0.90 
Had a pet  12
f  20  0.5 (0.2 to 1.1)  0.08 
Home infested by rats or mice  10  6  1.6 (0.7 to 3.9)  0.28 
Home infested by cockroaches  16  15  1.1 (0.6 to 2.0)  0.87 
Behavior related         
Wore a mask when going out         
Never  46  27  Reference   
Sometimes  27  30  0.5 (0.2 to 0.9)  0.02 
Always  27  43  0.3 (0.2 to 0.6)  <0.001 
Always washed hands before eating   83  89  0.6 (0.3 to 1.1)  0.11 
Always washed hands after using restrooms  88  93  0.5 (0.2 to 1.2)  0.10 
Always washed hands after returning home  78  90  0.3 (0.2 to 0.7)  0.003 
aOR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome. 
bDetermined by use of conditional logistic regression. Exposures refer to the 2 weeks before symptom onset for cases and the same 2-week period for matched controls. 
cFever clinics were established for triage of patients who might have SARS to separate them from other persons being evaluated in emergency rooms or outpatient 
clinics. 
 
dIncludes diabetes, cancer, immunosuppressive treatment, and other. 
eA
 gathering of >10 persons for a party or other social event. 
fPets reported by case-patients included dogs (3 cases), cats (3 cases), fish (1 case), and pigeons (1 case). community exposures were significantly more common
among case-patients than controls, including eating out or
taking taxis frequently. By univariate analysis, use of
other common transport (e.g., buses, subways) was also
associated with a risk for SARS. At least one well-publi-
cized case of SARS in Beijing occurred in a taxi driver
(12), but an increased risk among passengers had not pre-
viously been documented. Our findings regarding use of
transportation bordered on statistical significance and will
require validation by other studies.
We also used this investigation to quantify the impact
of behaviors (i.e., mask wearing, handwashing) that were
promoted to reduce the risk for SARS. Wearing masks out-
side the home in a reference period corresponding to the 2
weeks before symptom onset for cases was significantly
protective against clinical SARS. Supporting the validity
of this finding, there was a dose-response effect: by multi-
variable analysis, persons who always wore masks had a
70% lower risk of being diagnosed with clinical SARS
compared with those who never wore masks, and persons
with intermittent mask use had a 60% lower risk. Many
persons who wore masks in the community did not use N-
95 or similar highly efficient filtration devices, which have
been recommended for use in the hospital setting. We
sought details on the type of masks used but were unable
to evaluate the protective efficacy for different mask types.
We also were not able to differentiate protective efficacy
for SARS-CoV versus efficacy against other pneumonia
causes that met the clinical case definition. 
Handwashing has been recommended to prevent SARS
and other respiratory and diarrheal infections in which
contact is an important mode of transmission. We found
that consistently washing hands upon returning home was
associated with a reduced risk for clinical SARS by uni-
variate but not multivariate analysis. However, self-report-
ed handwashing practices may be particularly prone to
misclassification because respondents might provide the
answer they believe is expected of them.
We also explored the role of domestic animals in rela-
tion to SARS infection among persons without contact
with another SARS patient. An animal source for the ori-
gin of SARS-CoV in humans is suspected (13), and, using
polymerase chain reaction, investigators identified SARS-
CoV in household pets and cockroaches at the Amoy
Gardens apartments in Hong Kong (14). Thus, we won-
dered whether certain household pets or rodents might be
perpetuating disease-transmission cycles. One investigator
recently hypothesized that a rodent vector may have ampli-
fied transmission of SARS at Amoy Gardens (15). In addi-
tion, rumors circulating during the Beijing SARS outbreak
led to some calls for banning household pets or restricting
them from common areas. We sought evidence to address
this community fear and found that household rodents and
cockroaches were not associated with a risk for clinical
SARS. We also found that persons with pets had a signifi-
cantly lower risk for clinical SARS. This finding might
have occurred by chance or may be confounded by anoth-
er factor more directly related to pneumonia. However,
controls with pets might possibly have had exposure to
other animal coronaviruses that provided cross-reacting
antibody to the SARS-CoV. Of note, other investigators
found IgG to SARS-CoV was common among animal
traders in Guangdong (16), yet disease did not occur in this
population, a finding consistent with the hypothesis that
cross-reacting antibodies to a closely related virus may
have protected these workers.
Another unexpected finding was that visiting a farmer’s
market was associated with a reduced risk for clinical
SARS. Nevertheless, concern that farmers represented
travelers from other provinces and that markets were
crowded settings prompted us to ask about this exposure as
a possible risk factor. Accounting for an association with
lower risk is challenging. As with ownership of pets, this
finding may relate to unmeasured lifestyle factors more
directly related to pneumonia risk.
Among authorities in Beijing, a leading hypothesis for
the occurrence of clinical SARS among patients without
known contact with another SARS patient was that over-
diagnosis was occurring. We sought to determine the pro-
portion of case-patients in this study who could be con-
firmed by convalescent-phase serologic tests to be infect-
ed with SARS-CoV; however, we obtained serum samples
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Table 2. Factors significantly associated with acquisition of 
clinically diagnosed SARS in multivariate analysis
a 
Potential risk or protective 
factor for SARS 
Matched OR  
(95% CI)
a  p value 
Healthcare related     
Visited any fever clinic
b  12.7 (3.1 to 52.0)  <0.001 
Having any chronic disease  4.8 (1.7 to 13.2)  0.002 
Visited any farmer’s market  0.4 (0.2 to 0.8)  0.01 
Eating out     
Never  Reference   
Once a week  1.6 (0.7 to 3.8)  0.3 
More than once a week  3.1 (1.2 to 7.7)  0.02 
Taking a taxi     
Never  Reference   
Once a week  0.2 (0.1 to 0.8)  0.02 
More than once a week  3.0 (0.9 to 10.3)  0.07 
Had a pet  0.4 (0.2 to 0.9)  0.03 
Wore a mask when going out     
Never  Reference   
Sometimes  0.4 (0.2 to 0.9)  0.03 
Always  0.3 (0.1 to 0.6)  0.002 
aOR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; SARS, severe acute respiratory 
syndrome. 
bFever clinics were established for triage of patients who might have SARS to 
separate them from other persons being evaluated in emergency rooms or 
outpatient clinics. 
 from an insufficient number of case-patients to analyze
risk factors for laboratory-confirmed cases. Serologic test-
ing for SARS may not be 100% sensitive, and the Huada
test kit has had limited validation thus far. Nevertheless, a
substantial portion of case-patients without contact with
other SARS patients likely had pneumonia caused by
pathogens other than SARS-CoV.
Certain limitations to this study should be mentioned.
First, the study was conducted late in the Beijing epidem-
ic, after patients had been hospitalized for several weeks,
and the low participation rate might be attributable to
patients having already been interviewed multiple times.
Furthermore, recall bias might have influenced some of the
factors we explored. Telephone-based public health studies
were relatively new to Beijing, and the representativeness
of our control population is not known. Because the rate of
study participation by case-patients was not high, those
who agreed to participate may have self-selected for
unknown reasons that could have biased our findings. For
instance, several patients responding to the open-ended
comment section mentioned that they were certain their ill-
ness was “not SARS.” Relatively few patients agreed to
convalescent-phase serologic testing, and those who did
agree may have been more skeptical about the cause of
their pneumonia than were others, which may have skewed
the sample for which we have serologic results. 
In conclusion, we identified several explanations for
the occurrence of clinically defined SARS in persons with-
out contact with another SARS patient during Beijing’s
2003 SARS epidemic. The nonspecific clinical definition
for SARS led to reporting of many cases that were not con-
firmed to be caused by SARS-CoV. This apparent over-
diagnosis probably helped ensure rapid control of the out-
break by introducing a wide net for contact tracing and
patient isolation. Increased risk for clinically defined
SARS was associated with attending fever clinics, having
a chronic disease, and having certain community expo-
sures. Consistent mask use lowered the risk for disease,
thus providing some justification for the use of a strategy
that was very popular in the general community. Our find-
ing that pet owners had a lower risk for clinical SARS can
help dispel fears that domestic pets were causing disease
transmission in Beijing. Improved laboratory diagnostic
tests (i.e., tests with high sensitivity early in the illness and
with rapid turnaround) may eventually allow for more spe-
cific case reporting and management. Although human-to-
human transmission of SARS has apparently been inter-
rupted as of this writing, the factors associated with clini-
cally defined SARS in this study may help target future
efforts to control other respiratory infections, including
pandemic influenza, and will provide valuable evidence
for the control of SARS should the disease return. 
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